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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IN PROTECTING
ONE'S RIGHT TO SPEAK, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT ALSO PROTECTS ONE'S RIGHT
TO LIE-281 CARE COMMITTEE V ARNESON, 638

F.3D 621 (8TH CIR. 2011)
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the making of any law which "abridg[es] the freedom of speech."' While
content-based speech regulations have been viewed as presumptively
invalid, certain categories of content-based speech are deemed to fall
outside the "freedom of speech" protections. 2 The categories that have
been explicitly excluded are fighting words, obscenity, defamation, fraud,
child pornography, and speech integral to criminal conduct.3 In 281 Care
Committee v. Arneson,4 the Eighth Circuit considered whether a state may
enact a statute restricting knowingly or recklessly false campaign speech,
without demonstrating the First Amendment protections' requirement that

the enacted statute be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 5 The
court held that knowingly false campaign speech falls within the
protections of the First Amendment right to free speech, and, therefore,
any
6

such statute regulating it must withstand the test of strict scrutiny.

The suit at issue arose from three Minnesota-based grass-rootsadvocacy organizations that were founded to oppose school-funding ballot

I U.S. CONST. amend. I. This protection prevents the government from "proscribing
speech" or "expressive conduct" because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. See R.A.V. v.

City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (laying out First Amendment protections).
2

See R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 382-88 (stating content-based speech restrictions are generally

prohibited, but recognizing exceptions have been carved out).
3 See id.; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580 (2010) (adding "fraud,
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct"). If a category of speech is exempt from
First Amendment protection, then any law that is created that prohibits that speech does not need
to withstand strict scrutiny analysis; rather, the law is presumptively valid. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at
382-88. Strict scrutiny demands that a law be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest. See infra note 19 (setting forth strict scrutiny test).
4 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011).
5 See id. at 626 (stating issue before the court); see also United States v. Playboy Entm't
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating content-based speech restrictions must withstand
strict scrutiny test).
6

See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 636. The court, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, stated

that it "presumptively protect[s] all speech, including false statements," to ensure that "clearly
protected speech may flower in the shelter of the First Amendment." Id. (quoting United States
v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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initiatives. 7 These organizations and their respective leaders claimed that a
provision of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act ("FCPA") inhibits
their ability to protest freely against such ballot initiatives, thereby
violating the First Amendment. 8 The FCPA provides, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who
intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination,
or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign
material ... with respect to the effect of a ballot question,
that is designed or tends to . . . promote or defeat a ballot
question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or
communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether
it is false. 9
Although Minnesota criminalized defamatory campaign speech in
1893, its regulation of knowingly false campaign speech is fairly recent. 1°
Whereas between 1988 and 2004 the only enforcement mechanism for this
law was criminal prosecution, it now provides that violations of section
211B.06 will first be remedied through civil complaints."i This revised
version allows any person, organization, or agency to file a complaint with
the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH"), and then county attorneys
are given discretion to decide if the situation warrants criminal charges in
addition to the civil proceeding.12
In 2007, 281 Care Committee and its leader, Ron Stoffel, opposed
a Robbinsdale Public School District's ballot initiative.3
After the

7 Id. at 625. Minnesota law authorizes individual school boards to propose these ballot
initiatives. Id. The initiatives request citizens to approve "bond hikes" or "tax levies," which
would ultimately increase funding in local school districts. Id.
8 See id. (denoting plaintiff's arguments). The advocacy organizations and their leaders are
the plaintiffs in this suit, while four Minnesota county attorneys and the Minnesota attorney
general are the defendants. Id. All of these attorneys were sued in their capacities as
governmental officials. Id.
9 MINN. STAT. § 211B.06, subd. 1 (2008) (providing text of FCPA).
10 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625 (describing statutory history).
11 See id. (noting changes to the statute effective in 2004).
12 See id. (detailing new version of FCPA).
13 See id. (laying foundation for suit at issue).
The ballot initiative and opposition

immediately followed one that allegedly violated section 211B.06 of the FCPA the year before.
Id. at 625-26. In 2006, a citizen group called the "B.U.I.LD. Citizen Committee" held a
campaign where it advocated for a school-funding initiative in Howard Lake, Waverly-Winsted
Independent School District. Id. at 625. The WISE. Citizen Committee and its chairperson,
Victor Niska, campaigned against the initiative. Id. at 625-26. The B.U.I.L.D. committee filed a
complaint with the OAH under section 211B.06 of the FCPA, alleging that W.I.S.E. and Niska
circulated campaign materials that both W.I.S.E and Niska knew contained false information. Id.
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initiative was rejected, the superintendent of the school district informed
the media that officials were investigating 281 Care Committee about the
"false" information it spread during its opposition. 14 Following these
allegations, plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court, claiming that
section 21 1B.06 violates the First Amendment. 5 The plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment, while the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. 16 The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and ripeness, while also noting that it would have alternatively
dismissed for failure to state a claim.' 7 The Eighth Circuit reversed,
holding that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, that it also erred in upholding
section 21 1B.06 without conducting a strict-scrutiny analysis.'

8

Generally, content-based speech restrictions must meet the test of
strict scrutiny; however, certain classes of speech are exempt from this rule
because their prevention and punishment have never been considered as
raising constitutional issues. 19 These categories include fighting words,
obscenity, defamation, fraud, child pornography, and speech integral to
criminal conduct.2 0 Historically, courts have disagreed on the issue of

at 626. Following an evidentiary hearing, an OAH panel dismissed B.U.I.L.D.'s complaint. Id.
14 Id. Stoffel claimed that he interpreted the superintendent's statement to be a warning that
litigation would follow if 281 Care Committee continued to invoke these opposition tactics. Id.
15 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626 (explaining commencement of lawsuit); see also
supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting text of section 211B.06).
16 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626 (describing procedural history).
17 See id.
(explaining district court's holding). The district court's holding that it would have
dismissed for failure to state a claim implies that the section of the FCPA at issue falls outside the
protections of the First Amendment and, thus, does not require the strict scrutiny analysis that
applies to those statutes which fall within the protections of the First Amendment. Id.at 633.
1 See id.
at 633, 636 (stating holding).
19 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (reiterating
standard of review for content-based speech restrictions); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting First Amendment right not absolute). The Supreme Court
reasoned that these limited exempted areas are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. To withstand strict scrutiny analysis, a facially
content-based statute must be necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest. See Burson
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).
20 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing categories of speech explicitly exempted
from First Amendment protections). While these categories of speech are, in fact, content-based,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment is inapplicable to them
because "their expressive content is worthless or of de minimis value to society." R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). In its holding that
the First Amendment is inapplicable to these categories of speech, the Supreme Court implied
that these categories of speech "can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because
of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)

not that they are
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whether knowingly false speech is considered to be one of these types of
speech that is categorically exempt from First Amendment protection. 2 1 In
22
Garrison v. Louisiana,
the United States Supreme Court explained that
knowingly false speech is valueless and, thus, a type of speech that is
categorically exempt from First Amendment protection. 23
However,
Garrison concerned defamatory speech, which is already exempt from
242
protection. 24 In UnitedStates v. Alvarez,25 the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
Garrison, holding that decisions that declare knowingly false speech as
"valueless" do not answer the question of whether it is categorically
exempt from First Amendment protection.26
Although the defendants in the present case interpreted the
categorical exemption of defamatory speech as an exemption of all

categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles
for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content." R.A. V, 505 U.S.
at 383-84. To exemplify this statement, the Supreme Court explains that while the government
can lawfully prohibit libel, it cannot prohibit libel that only criticizes the government. See id. at
384-86 (clarifying distinction between entire category of content-based speech and limited
category).
21 See infra notes 23-26, 28-34 (detailing decisions for and against categorically excluding
false speech from First Amendment protection).
22 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
23 See id. at 75 (stating holding of case). The court noted that "even where the utterance is
false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area
preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or recklessfalsehood." Id. at
73 (emphasis added).
24 See id. at 65-66 (setting forth factual history where defendant was convicted of criminal
defamation); see also R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 383 (assigning defamation as category explicitly
excluded from First Amendment protection).
25 617F.3d 1198 (9thCir. 2010).
26 See id. at 1200 (declaring Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional). The Stolen Valor Act made
it a crime to make false statements about one's own military service. Id. at 1119 & n.1. The
court looked to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), in an effort to ascertain a formula
that proscribes what areas of false factual speech, beyond defamation and fraud, may be explicitly
exempt from First Amendment protection. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1214. In Schenck, the Supreme
Court set forth a requirement that in order to be restricted, the speech must be "uttered under
circumstances likely to be the proximate cause of an imminent harm within the scope of
Congress' legitimate reach." Id. at 1215 (citing Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52). The Ninth Circuit
opined that the Schenck rule is "highly relevant" to the identified exempted classes of speech (i.e.,
defamation and fraud), as well as other classes of speech that have been held to be "unworthy of
constitutional protection." See id. at 1214-15 (looking for formula to determine which areas of
speech are unprotected). The other classes of speech that are not given constitutional protection
are threats that are made with the intent of placing a victim in fear of bodily harm or death,
speech that is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action, and words spoken in public
places that are likely to cause a breach of the peace. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60
(2003) (restricting threats made with intent to place victim in fear of bodily harm or death);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (prohibiting speech which incites or produces
lawless action); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (prohibiting speechin a
public place which may cause breach of peace).

2012]

281 CARE COMMITTEE V ARNESON

knowingly false speech, the two are distinguishable .27 Namely, defamation
involves important private interests that political speech does not.28 Noting
this important distinction, the Ninth Circuit explained its reluctance to
extend defamatory statements into a new context in order to create another
exception to the First Amendment protections. 29 Another concern is that
ballot initiatives are considered to be prototypical political speech, which is
one of the primary matters the First Amendment protects.30 Thus, courts
must take into account that the First Amendment serves to "constrai[n] the
collective authority of temporary political majorities to exercise their power
by determining for everyone what is true and false, as well as what is right
and wrong."' 1
Despite these distinctions and concerns, in his dissenting opinion
of Alvarez, Judge Bybee emphasized the explicit words of the Supreme
Court that false statements of fact "are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality." 32 Judge Bybee combines this quote with
two others from the Supreme Court to support his argument that false
statements of fact should not be given First Amendment protection: that
"the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection,"
27

28

See infra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining distinction).
See Charles Fried, The New FirstAmendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.

CHL L. REv. 225, 238 (1992) (reasoning defamation is an actionable wrong because it vindicates
private rights invoked on private individuals); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (explaining defamation is punishable because of damage to individual's
reputation). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the private interests that
defamation law seeks to protect are not at issue in political speech because governmental entities
cannot bring actions for libel or defamation. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291
(1964) (explaining why criminal pmsecutions for libel on government have no place in American
jurisprudence).
29 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1208 ("[W]e are not eager to extend a statement (often quoted,
but often qualified) made in the complicated area of defamation jurisprudence into a new context
in order to justify an unprecedented and vast exception to First Amendment guarantees.").
30 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (noting "universal agreement" that First
Amendment was meant to protect free discussion of politics). The underlying concern regarding
political speech is the danger of governmental oppression. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (noting "danger of censorship" as reason for strict scrutiny requirement
(quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the FirstAmendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat

Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1109 (2006) (stating unlimited governmental
power to prohibit deception would infringe "personal and political self-rule").
31

See Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless

Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008) (expressing concerns regarding restricting political
speech).
32 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1218 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and that "both inside and outside of the defamation context . . . false
statements of fact are valueless and generally not within the protection of
the First Amendment."33 Therefore, contrary to the holdings of the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, Judge Bybee interprets the general rule as "false
statements of fact are not protected by the First Amendment," excepting
those situations where protecting a false statement is necessary to "protect
speech that matters."34 While the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have expressed
their opinion that knowingly false speech is not categorically exempt from
First Amendment protections, not all prior decisions and courts agree with
this line of reasoning.3 5
In 281 Care Committee v.Arneson,36 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the fundamental question of
whether a state may enact a statute that restricts knowingly or recklessly
false political speech without first demonstrating that the statute is
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 37 After concluding that the
district court's approach was erroneous, the court remanded the case to
allow the district court to perform the proper strict scrutiny analysis
required of statutes that infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights.38
The court discussed the issue by laying forth the general rule that contentbased speech restrictions infringe upon First Amendment protections, and,
therefore, must withstand strict scrutiny analysis in order to be upheld.39
While acknowledging the well-established exceptions to First Amendment
protections, the Eight Circuit disagreed with the district court's holding
because the Supreme Court "has never placed knowingly false campaign

33 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1220 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (explaining why some categories of
false statements of fact should not be protected); see also, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (noting false statements not protected "for their own sake"); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (declaring false statements valueless and
disruptive of truth-seeking purpose of public information); Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (declaring false statements not "immunized" by First Amendment);
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) (explaining spreading false information carries "no
First Amendment credentials").
34 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1219-21 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)
(internal quotation mark omitted) (rejecting general rule that all speech is presumptively

protected).
35 See supra notes 18, 26 and accompanying text (stating holdings of Eighth and Ninth
Circuits); see also supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (laying out opposing argument).
36 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011).
37 Id.at 626.
38 See id.
at 633 (summarizing holding). The district court determined that the knowingly or
recklessly false campaign speech at issue falls outside the protections of the First Amendment,
thus concluding that a strict scrutiny analysis was unnecessary. Id.at 633-34.
39 See id.
at 634-35 (recognizing history of question before court).
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40
speech categorically outside the protection of the First Amendment.,
The Eight Circuit struck down the district court's reliance on
decisions that deem knowingly false speech "valueless" and, thus,
"categorically exempt from First Amendment protection," because the
cases from which that language is derived involved fraudulent or
defamatory speech. 41 Based on this determination, the court declared that it
would follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit, which had concluded that the

dicta from these cases do not answer the question of whether knowingly
false speech is categorically exempt from constitutional protection. 42 The
Eighth Circuit further criticized the district court's decision by pointing out
the distinction between exempting all defamatory speech, as opposed to
exempting all knowingly false speech. 43 While conceding that knowingly
false speech is often valueless, the decision emphasized that it is not the
responsibility of the appellate courts to determine which categories of
speech are wholly exempted from First Amendment protection.44 As
further justification for this finding, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that
courts must be careful not to encroach upon the right of individuals to
freely discuss and criticize political affairs. 45 Based upon the foregoing
reasons, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its decision to adopt the general rule
that courts presumptively protect all speech, including speech that is
knowingly false.46

40

See id. at 633-34 (discussing well-defined exclusions from First Amendment protection

and rejecting district court's holding).
41 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634 (noting faults in district court's decision). These
types of speech are already exempted from protection. Id.; see also supra note 23 and
accompanying text (summarizing Garrison decision which held valueless speech does not enjoy
constitutional protection).
42 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634-35 (adopting reasoning of Ninth Circuit's Alvarez
decision); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (outlining Ninth Circuit's holding and
reasoning).
43 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634 (distinguishing defamatory speech and knowingly
false speech); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining distinction).
44 See 281 Care Committee, 638 F.3d at 635 (declining to establish knowingly false speech
as new category of speech exempt from First Amendment). In articulating this point, the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that prior decisions that have exempted categories of speech from protection are
"descriptive not prescriptive." Id. Expanding upon this, the court explained that these previous
decisions detail the type of speech exempted, but that they do not provide a formula for
determining which other types of speech are exempted. Id.; see also supra note 26 and
accompanying text (detailing Ninth Circuit's attempt to ascertain formula for excluded types of
speech).
45 See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 635-36 (noting particular unwillingness to create new
exception where speech at issue is political in nature). In its reasoning, the court recognizes that
political speech is "at the heart of the protections of the First Amendment." Id. at 635 (citing
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
46 See id. at 636 (stating holding and basis for same). It is important to note that this holding
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In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, the Eighth Circuit maintained
that knowingly false speech is not categorically exempt from First
Amendment protection. 47 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Alvarez provided
the court with a reasonable basis for this conclusion; namely, that
knowingly false speech has not yet been categorically exempted from
protection, and those areas that have been categorically exempted are
distinguishable from all knowingly false speech. 48 As a result, the court
bolstered the reasoning behind why knowingly false speech is not
categorically exempt from protection, while also providing an analytical
approach to determining why other categories of speech, which have been
exempted, are applicable only to those specific areas of speech. 49 While
making these clarifications and providing a basis for how these problems
should be approached, the Eighth Circuit appropriately acknowledges and
maintains its position as an appellate court by explicitly declining to
declare a new category of speech as falling outside the protections of the
First Amendment.50 In actually approaching the merits of the issue, the
court tactfully acknowledges the concerns that arise with protecting
knowingly false speech, thereby demonstrating its empathy for the ears
upon which such false information falls. 5' Furthermore, by explaining that
political speech is of the utmost importance for First Amendment
considerations, the court appropriately solidifies its basis for which to
conclude that it is particularly important to protect the speech in the instant
52
case.
Despite the Eighth Circuit's well reasoned analysis of the issue,
Judge Bybee's dissenting opinion in Alvarez resonates with readers from a
policy perspective . 5' In criticizing the majority opinion in Alvarez, Judge
Bybee points out the inconsistency whereby the majority quotes from the

does not imply that a state may never restrict knowingly false speech; rather, it may only do so
after it has established that such a restriction is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest. Id.
47 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating holding of case).

See supra notes 26, 28 and accompanying text (explaining which areas have been
exempted and which have not, and distinguishing between them).
49 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (detailing reasons why knowingly false
speech not exempt); see also supra note 44 (explaining difference between "descriptive" and
"proscriptive" decisions).
50 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting it is not position of the courts of appeals
to make this determination).
51 See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011) (conceding that false
speech is often valueless).
52 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting political speech is of utmost importance
for First Amendment purposes).
53 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (articulating Judge Bybee's arguments).
48
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Supreme Court's statement in Garrisonthat "the knowingly false statement
...do[es] not enjoy constitutional protection," while holding that Alvarez's
knowingly false statement is entitled to full constitutional protection.54
Thus, on its face, it appears that both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
preserved their stance, notwithstanding explicit language from the Supreme

Court that has exempted false statements of fact from constitutional
protection.5 5 Despite these concerns, the Ninth Circuit notes an important
problem with Judge Bybee's rule that false statements of fact are not
protected: if this were the rule, states would be permitted to criminalize
"lying about one's height, weight, age, or financial status on Match.com or
Facebook."56 Although it seems far-fetched that a state would enact laws
prohibiting such types of speech, the Ninth Circuit elucidates an important
consideration to rebut the general rule that Judge Bybee proffers in his
dissent.57
Although the Eighth Circuit is correct in its notion that the First
Amendment's mainstay function is protecting free discussion, including the
criticism of political matters, it seems appropriate in this context to delve
further into this function and apply it to the case at bar. 58 As noted, the
First Amendment is designed to protect the public from oppression and
censorship. 59 However, in 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, a political
organization is seeking to protect its speech. 60 Thus, it seems that an
important interest to protect is the right of the citizens upon which the false

54

See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J. dissenting)

(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)) (criticizing discrepancy in majority
opinion).
55 See supra notes 29, 46 and accompanying text (stating holdings of Eighth and Ninth
Circuits); see also Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 (stating First Amendment is inapplicable to false
statements because content is worthless); supra note 33 and accompanying text (summarizing
Supreme Court decisions that hold false statements are unprotected). Also noteworthy is the fact
that, while Garrison is written in the context of defamation, there is no language which qualifies
the Supreme Court's statement that the knowingly false statement does not enjoy constitutional
protection as being applicable only to defamatory statements. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75
("Hence, the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of
the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.").
56 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200 (noting court's problem with Judge Bybee's analysis). The
court went on to say that it would also permit states to create laws prohibiting individuals from
lying to one's parents about smoking, drinking, speeding, or being a virgin. Id.
57 See id. (explaining faults in Judge Bybee's analysis).
58 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (justifying holding based on fact that speech at
issue is political in nature).
59 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (explaining danger of censorship

requires strict scrutiny analysis).
60 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (reasoning political speech invokes special

considerations); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (stating political organization. 281
Care Committee, filed suit to challenge constitutionality of FCPA).
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information is directed.6 ' Indeed, it is in fact those citizens who will be
voting on whether to approve such a ballot initiative, and it seems contrary
to public policy to allow politicians the ability to distort information so as
to induce misinformed citizens to vote in their favor.62 This may, however,
be a consideration in the district court's strict scrutiny analysis, which the
Eighth Circuit rightfully orders in its decision.63
In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether knowingly false speech
is categorically exempt from First Amendment protection, thereby making
it impermissible irrespective of strict scrutiny review.
The court
appropriately acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit has afforded a decision
that explains that no court has explicitly exempted knowingly false speech
from protection. Also accurate is the notion that false speech is generally
of little value, and thus a concern with regard to First Amendment
protection. However, greater deference should be afforded to the dicta in
Garrison and its progeny, in which the United States Supreme Court
explicitly asserted that false statements of fact "do not enjoy constitutional
protection." While emphasizing the importance of protecting the freedom
of political speech, this decision fails to consider that the false political
speech at issue is that of political organizations, rather than citizens, which
could potentially result in the very censorship and oppression that the
United States Constitution seeks to prevent.
Jaclyn McNeely

61

See supra note 7, 28-31 and accompanying text (explaining ballot initiative opposition

materials are speech at issue).
62 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (stating purpose of organization is to oppose
ballot initiatives). This could lead to the very censorship and oppression which the First
Amendment seeks to prevent. See supra notes 30, 59 and accompanying text (expressing
concerns with censorship and oppression when false political speech is protected).
63

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (remanding case for strict scrutiny analysis).

